Announcement Regarding the Release of Investigation Results Concerning the Outflow of Funds and Measures to Prevent Recurrence
JELLY BEANS GROUP Co.,Ltd. (JBG)
Transfers from the Company's accounts to external accounts, and transfer instructions issued via email and LINE groups
An external social engineering scam (business email compromise). The incident also reflected areas for improvement in the internal control framework and information security measures.
¥45 million (recorded as an extraordinary loss attributable to the transfer fraud)
¥45 million (funds transferred to an account in the name of 株式会社X. The funds are highly likely to have been transferred and dispersed to secondary accounts, overseas accounts and other destinations.)
Related procedures
Investigation by a special investigation committee, consultation with the police and investigation by the authorities, and consideration of claims for the return of the transferred funds and other legal measures
Tsukishima Police Station, investigative authorities
Company response
A special investigation committee was established on 9 July 2026. The chair was Baba Takanobu (馬場崇暢), JBG's full-time corporate auditor. The members were Komine Takashi (小峰孝史), JBG's outside corporate auditor and an attorney; Shimizu Kazuya (清水和也), JBG's outside corporate auditor; and Okamoto Kentaro (岡本健太郎), an attorney. The investigation was conducted with advice from 株式会社エルテス and attorneys.
(1) Strengthening internal controls over fund transfers, (2) clarifying communication methods for transfer instructions, (3) strengthening information security measures, (4) strengthening compliance training and awareness initiatives, (5) establishing communication and approval procedures for emergencies and other situations, and (6) strengthening management systems, monitoring and audit functions
The Company will continue implementing measures to prevent recurrence and continuously verify their effectiveness. It will consider legal measures, including making further inquiries into the user information for the LINE account used by the impersonated president, Miyazaki (宮﨑), and pursuing a claim against 株式会社X for the return of the transferred funds, as well as other claims for liability.
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Event name | Announcement Regarding the Release of Investigation Results Concerning the Outflow of Funds and Measures to Prevent Recurrence |
| Date of occurrence | 3 June 2026 (fraudulent transfer instructions were issued from 2 to 3 June 2026, and ¥45 million was transferred on 3 June) |
| Date recognized / date notice received | 3 June 2026 (the incident was discovered after 10:10 a.m.), 29 September 2026 (the investigation report was received) |
| Subject Entity | JELLY BEANS GROUP Co.,Ltd. (JBG) |
| Target Locations / Products | Transfers from the Company's accounts to external accounts, and transfer instructions issued via email and LINE groups |
| Cause | An external social engineering scam (business email compromise). The incident also reflected areas for improvement in the internal control framework and information security measures. |
| Amount of Impact on Business Performance | ¥45 million (recorded as an extraordinary loss attributable to the transfer fraud) |
| Type of litigation or proceeding | Investigation by a special investigation committee, consultation with the police and investigation by the authorities, and consideration of claims for the return of the transferred funds and other legal measures |
| Court or authority | Tsukishima Police Station, investigative authorities |
| Amount of receivables at risk of non-collection or delayed collection | ¥45 million (funds transferred to an account in the name of 株式会社X. The funds are highly likely to have been transferred and dispersed to secondary accounts, overseas accounts and other destinations.) |
| Investigation structure | A special investigation committee was established on 9 July 2026. The chair was Baba Takanobu (馬場崇暢), JBG's full-time corporate auditor. The members were Komine Takashi (小峰孝史), JBG's outside corporate auditor and an attorney; Shimizu Kazuya (清水和也), JBG's outside corporate auditor; and Okamoto Kentaro (岡本健太郎), an attorney. The investigation was conducted with advice from 株式会社エルテス and attorneys. |
| Measures to prevent recurrence | (1) Strengthening internal controls over fund transfers, (2) clarifying communication methods for transfer instructions, (3) strengthening information security measures, (4) strengthening compliance training and awareness initiatives, (5) establishing communication and approval procedures for emergencies and other situations, and (6) strengthening management systems, monitoring and audit functions |
| Outlook | The Company will continue implementing measures to prevent recurrence and continuously verify their effectiveness. It will consider legal measures, including making further inquiries into the user information for the LINE account used by the impersonated president, Miyazaki (宮﨑), and pursuing a claim against 株式会社X for the return of the transferred funds, as well as other claims for liability. |
Items this document does not state (12)
These are items the company does not state in this document. We do not leave them blank, nor fill them in from other sources or by inference.
The reasons the company gives
The company's own explanation, not something inferred from the numbers.The direct cause was that a third party impersonated an officer and instructed the Company to make transfers by email and LINE. The underlying issues in internal controls and information security included insufficient segregation of payment authority, advance transfers made without following formal procedures, the routine use of non-approved communication tools, a corporate culture that prioritised speed, and difficulty verifying instructions due to remote and dispersed working arrangements.